A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight - A Comment on Lisa Fairfax by Kaal, Wulf A.
University of St. Thomas Law Journal
Volume 10
Issue 2 Fall 2012 Article 4
2012
A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of
the Duty of Oversight - A Comment on Lisa Fairfax
Wulf A. Kaal
University of St. Thomas School of Law, kaal8634@stthomas.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal. For more information,
please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu.
Bluebook Citation
Wulf A. Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight - A Comment on Lisa Fairfax, 10 U. St. Thomas L.J.
460 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 1  3-JAN-14 15:33
ARTICLE
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE
LIMITATIONS OF THE DUTY OF
OVERSIGHT – A COMMENT ON
LISA FAIRFAX
WULF A. KAAL*
In her article Managing Expectations: Does the Directors’ Duty to
Monitor Promise More than it Can Deliver?, Professor Lisa Fairfax evalu-
ates the practical limitations of the duty to monitor.1 Professor Fairfax’s
point is as unmistakable as it is insightful and provocative: the oversight
doctrine offers false hope that enhancing directors’ oversight responsibili-
ties can improve corporate governance. The oversight doctrine creates ex-
pectations that directors cannot possibly fulfill. In effect, the duty to
monitor promises more than it can actually deliver.
Professor Fairfax points to the significance of the duty of oversight,
especially in the context of the credit crisis, and its role as “one of the
primary causes of the financial crisis.”2 Professor Fairfax underscores that
the outcomes of the crisis could have been improved if directors had more
rigorously exercised their duty of oversight. However, as she points out, the
doctrine of the duty of oversight “may be too immature and incoherent.”3
Without a workable duty of oversight, corporate directors seeking to com-
ply with the oversight duty lack meaningful guidance as to the expected
conduct. Combined with a growing and ever more complex modern corpo-
ration, it may be “impractical for directors to successfully engage in over-
* Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minneapolis). This article
is a comment on Lisa Fairfax’s article Managing Expectations:  Does the Directors’ Duty to
Monitor Promise More than it Can Deliver. The author would like to thank Professor Fairfax for
her support and feedback during the drafting and editing process. He would also like to thank his
colleagues Lyman Johnson and Brett McDonnell for their feedback and insightful comments on
earlier drafts. The author would also like to thank research librarian Valerie Aggerbeck for her
assistance.
1. Lisa M. Fairfax, Managing Expectations: Does the Directors’ Duty to Monitor Promise
More than it Can Deliver?, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 416 (2012).
2. Id. at 417.
3. Id. at 418.
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sight.”4 Professor Fairfax argues that, because directors serve part-time as
outsiders, it may be unreasonable to expect directors to have the knowledge,
capacity, and expertise to “effectively monitor the business affairs of large,
and increasingly complex, corporations.”5 As a result, Professor Fairfax
concludes that attempts to enhance oversight may fail, and an emphasis on
improving oversight as a means of enhancing corporate governance could
be ill-advised.6
Professor Fairfax also notes that in the United States, imposing liabil-
ity on directors for oversight breaches is nearly impossible.7 This point is
well illustrated in In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation.8
According to the complaint, starting in May 2005, “red flags” pertaining to
Citigroup’s investments in real estate and credit markets should have
alerted the defendants to serious risk of investment loss.9 By disregarding
these warning signs, the defendants allegedly sacrificed the long-term via-
bility of Citigroup for the sake of short-term profits.10 Shareholder plaintiffs
alleged that the directors failed to properly disclose the company’s exposure
to subprime assets and that they breached their fiduciary duties by failing to
properly manage and monitor the risk that Citigroup faced from problems in
the subprime lending market.11 The Delaware Chancery Court found that
the duty to monitor for illegal conduct under the Caremark12 line of cases
should not be extended to impose oversight liability for business risk.13 The
court therefore upheld the business judgment rule and its protection of di-
rectors’ business decisions in the face of worldwide economic losses. Ac-
cording to the Delaware Chancery Court, directors’ incorrect evaluation of
business risk and their inability to predict the future did not violate direc-
tors’ duty of oversight. Losses alone do not suffice to hold directors person-
ally liable for taking risks that lead to losses because risk is inherent in
maximizing shareholder value. However, oversight liability can be estab-
lished if the plaintiff shows that “the directors knew they were not discharg-
ing their fiduciary [duties] or that the directors demonstrated a conscious
disregard for their responsibilities . . . .”14
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 418.
8. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
9. Id. at 114–15.
10. Id. at 111.
11. Id.
12. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (expanding directors’ duty of care to
include a duty to monitor for illegal conduct).
13. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (reaffirming the Caremark duties
and describing the duty of oversight for liability purposes as a facet of the duty of loyalty).
14. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106, 123 (Del. Ch. 2009) (emphasis omitted).
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Most importantly, Professor Fairfax explains why, while Delaware law
may signal the most appropriate standard of conduct,15 Delaware’s signal-
ing of expected conduct is undermined if it imposes a nearly insurmounta-
ble standard for liability in cases involving breaches of the duty of
oversight.16 Supporting Professor Fairfax’s argument, Professors Johnson
and Garvis show in an empirical study that courts often provide very spe-
cific language regarding the appropriate standard of conduct for directors.17
However, their study highlights that lawyers do not sufficiently communi-
cate to directors what conduct is expected of them.18 Inadequately informed
directors may underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in
more risky behavior than is desirable for the company itself.
I. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE DUTY TO MONITOR
Professor Fairfax makes important arguments suggesting that the duty
of oversight in the United States promises more than it can actually deliver.
In particular, the nearly insurmountable standard for liability in oversight
cases and its effect on signaling the expected standard of conduct could
have long-term implications for corporate law in the United States. Other
countries, however, have stricter liability standards.
Compared to the United States, Germany has taken a stricter approach
to cases involving a breach of the duty of oversight. The German business
judgment rule19 requires a showing of the same elements as the American
business judgment rule.20 However, the application of the German business
judgment rule is much less clear in an environment of increased systemic
risk, such as the recent credit crisis.21 After evaluating legal liability rules in
15. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 427. R
16. Id. at 428.
17. See Lyman P. Q. Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fidu-
ciary Duties? 64 BUS. LAW. 1105, 1111–17 (2009) (discussing the methodology and results of the
empirical survey); see also Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and
Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 866 (2009) (stating that lawyers do
not sufficiently advise directors).
18. See, e.g., Johnson & Garvis, supra note 17, at 1110 (“Overall, officers appear to be
somewhat under-advised about fiduciary duties . . . at least to the extent liability rules shape
conduct.”).
19. The German business judgment rule was introduced in 2005 as part of the Gesetz zur
Unternehmensintegrita¨t und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG) and implemented in
§ 93(1)–(2) of the German Stock Corporation Act. See Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation
Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I.] at 1089, § 93(1)–(2) (Ger.).
20. The basic elements of the business judgment rule in both the United States and Germany
are: a decision by management, for the benefit of the corporation, based on sufficient information,
and with no conflicts of interest. See id. for a description of the German elements of the business
judgment rule. See also, In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (explaining the business
judgment rule applies to decisions of directors who perform their duties (1) in good faith, (2) with
care of an ordinarily prudent person, and (3) in the best interests of the corporation).
21. Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: Con-
straints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1433, 1465 (2010).
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the aftermath of the financial crisis, German commentators22 concluded that
managers do not act reasonably in terms of the German business judgment
rule if risks taken on behalf of the corporation result in the demise of the
corporation.23 In its ARAG/Garmenbeck decision, the Bundesgerichtshof
(BGH), Germany’s highest court in civil matters, explained that if the “bus-
iness risk was inappropriately excessive,” directors’ business decisions are
not protected under the German business judgment rule.24 This holding is
diametrically opposed to the holding in In re Citigroup, where the Delaware
Chancery Court declared that directors’ incorrect evaluation of business risk
did not violate directors’ duty of oversight.25
In another case, In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation
(“Disney”),26 the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme
Court both held that the directors were not liable for awarding $130 million
to Michael Ovitz for serving only one year as the number two executive at
Disney. Over the course of almost a decade, this litigation spawned five
published opinions by Delaware courts—two from the Delaware Supreme
Court and three from the Delaware Chancery Court.27 The Delaware Chan-
cery Court initially viewed the payout to Michael Ovitz as an unremarkable
exercise of business judgment. On appeal, however, the Delaware Supreme
Court opined that Disney’s disorderly board processes and the size of the
payout rendered the outcome on both the waste and process claims a close
case.28 Although the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of
plaintiffs’ claim on the grounds of deficient pleading, it advised the Chan-
cery Court to grant the plaintiffs leave to amend.
By contrast, the BGH determined in Mannesmann29 that the directors
of the German Mannesmann AG breached their fiduciary duty to the com-
pany by awarding a bonus of approximately $17 million to the Mannes-
mann CEO whose tenure at Mannesmann resulted in a substantial increase
of shareholder value. In the 1990s, Mannesmann’s CEO, Klaus Esser, suc-
22. Contrary to their counterparts in the United States, German courts rely heavily on the
expertise of commentators.
23. Marcus Lutter, Die Business Judgment Rule und Ihre Praktische Anwendung, 18 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT F ¨UR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] [J. BUS. L.] 841, 843–45 (2007) (Ger.); AktG at
§ 93(1)–(2) (providing the five core elements of the German business judgment rule: (1) a busi-
ness decision by management, (2) for the benefit of the corporation, (3) no conflict of interest, (4)
based on sufficient information, and (5) no “hazard” decision or no excessive risk taking).
24. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 21, 1997, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1926, 1997 (Ger.).
25. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009).
26. In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 75 (Del. 2006).
27. See id. Three earlier published court opinions pertain to the same litigation: In re Walt
Disney, 731 A.2d 342, 353 (Del. Ch. 1998) (dismissing complaint); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244, 267 (Del. 2000) (affirming dismissal but granting Plaintiff leave to amend); In re Walt Dis-
ney, 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003) (declining motion to dismiss amended complaint).
28. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249.
29. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 21, 2005, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 522, 2006 (Ger.).
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cessfully turned the company from a German company with a focus on
heavy machinery into an international conglomerate operating a successful
cell phone network. In November 1999, Esser successfully negotiated
Vodafone’s friendly takeover of Mannesmann. The final merger agreement
valued Mannesmann’s stock at C= 360 per share. Compared to the initial
offer rejected by Esser, the deal negotiated by Esser increased the value for
Mannesmann stockholders by more than C= 63 billion. However, when Man-
nesmann’s compensation committee awarded Esser a bonus of $17 million
in recognition of his extraordinary accomplishments, the majority of the
German public and press reacted negatively. On March 7, 2000, an attorney
representing smaller German companies filed criminal charges against the
members of Mannesmann’s compensation committee, among others, for
breach of trust (Untreue – Section 266 of the German Penal Code). Defend-
ants agreed to pay C= 5.8 million and the case was settled.30
Comparative corporate law research is challenging and may include
inaccuracies as a result of countries’ different legal histories, legal origins,
and legal cultures. Comparing Disney and Mannesmann is challenging and
inexact, but like the comparison between In re Citigroup and ARAG, it un-
derscores the differences between Delaware and German law regarding the
allocation of liability. Both comparisons are based on cases involving ex-
treme facts, placing the cases at the cusp of culpable conduct, and both
cases take place in different contexts. Disney involves a termination under
an employment contract while Mannesmann addresses a gratuitous bonus.
Despite the limitations and inaccuracies in these comparisons, it seems dif-
ficult to escape the conclusion that had the two American cases, In re Ci-
tigroup and Disney, been decided in Germany, the liability allocation would
have been different. German courts generally seem more willing to second-
guess directors’ decisions than Delaware courts. The different legal stan-
dards for liability allocation in Germany and the United States illustrate
their rather different legal and societal attitudes towards managers’ risk-
taking.
Lowering the standard for liability in oversight cases in the United
States could address several of the duty of oversight’s shortcomings de-
scribed above. Delaware’s signaling of expected conduct31 could be dra-
30. Id.
31. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 428, n.136; see also Lyman Johnson, Debarring Faithless Cor-
porate and Religious Fiduciaries in Bankruptcy, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 523, 532, 538
(2011)
Debarment relief has the advantage of sanctioning misconduct while not depleting the
financial resources of companies themselves, whose investor and creditor constituencies
may be unaware of and innocent of wrongdoing. This is of particular importance if the
misconduct created significant financial distress for the business because government
monetary penalties could crowd out private claimants. And, unlike the case with money
damages or civil penalties, bar orders are entirely forward looking and can pointedly
seek to prevent repeat behavior in a specified setting . . . . The debarment remedy,
moreover, does not visit money damages per se on the wrongdoer, thereby blunting
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matically improved with a moderate standard for liability in cases involving
breaches of the duty of oversight. Directors and officers would take their
increased personal liability exposure into account and could be incentivized
to engage in less risky behavior. Arguably, the outcomes of the last finan-
cial crisis could have been improved if directors had more rigorously exer-
cised their duty of oversight because of looming personal liability. With an
increase in liability, courts would also have an opportunity to clarify the
oversight doctrine. The duty of oversight could, thus, evolve into a mature
and coherent doctrine.32 With a workable duty of oversight, corporate direc-
tors would be in a better position to obtain meaningful guidance regarding
the expected conduct. Indeed, the complexities of the ever-growing modern
corporation would perhaps need to be adjusted to facilitate directors’ suc-
cessful oversight.33
Increased liability is no panacea and cannot alone adequately address
the central shortcomings of the duty of oversight and corporate governance
in the United States that Professor Fairfax identifies.34 Even if directors
face heightened liability, it would probably still be unreasonable to expect
directors to have the knowledge, capacity, and expertise to “effectively
monitor the business affairs of large, and increasingly complex, corpora-
tions.”35 After all, directors serve part-time as outsiders.36 Moreover, cost
increases and path dependencies may make it nearly impossible to relax the
close to insurmountable standard for liability in oversight cases. This
weighs in favor of Professor Fairfax’s conclusion that attempts to enhance
oversight in the United States may fail, and an emphasis on improving over-
sight as a means of enhancing corporate governance could be ill-advised.37
II. DYNAMIC REGULATION
Professor Fairfax’s critique of the duty of oversight and the role of
directors in corporate governance implicates the broader corporate govern-
ance framework in the United States.38 Since 2002, corporate governance in
the United States has not just once but twice been substantially upgraded
potential criticisms that it will dissuade persons from serving in senior governance posi-
tions or lead to excessive risk averse behavior for fear of personal monetary liability,
and it does not penalize the company itself and thereby compete with private creditors
for limited organizational funds. Critically, it is forward looking and preventive in its
orientation.
32. Contra Fairfax, supra note 1, at 418 (discussing the incoherency and immaturity of the R
current doctrine of oversight).
33. Contra id. (explaining the complexities of the modern corporation).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 418 (stating that directors serving part-time as outsiders “may
make it unreasonable to expect that directors have the expertise, knowledge, and capacity to effec-
tively monitor the business affairs of large, and increasingly complex, corporations.”).
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after more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity.39 At the
most general level, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) aimed to increase board
independence, fix the audit process, and improve disclosure and trans-
parency.40 Only eight years later, Congress again overhauled the corporate
governance regime in the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank).41 Although some
may argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act addressed
different regulatory concerns precipitated by different causes in different
market environments and different economic conditions, a noteworthy com-
mon denominator between SOX and Dodd-Frank and other reform propos-
als is the use of a top-down regulatory approach (i.e., direct regulatory
intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules).
39. Wulf A. Kaal, Zwangswandelanleihen als Dynamische Regulierung der Finanzmark-
tindustrie, in FESTSCHRIFT KIRCHNER (Wulf Kaal, Andreas Schwartze, Matthias Schmidt & Ulrich
Ehricke eds., 2013).
40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); Roberta Ro-
mano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J.
1521, 1529–43 (2005) (providing an evaluation of the substantive corporate governance mandates
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2012); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 11–18 (2002) (reviewing
some of the reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and discussing how these reforms purportedly
respond to the problems discussed in the first part of the article); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate
Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policy Makers
Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 251 (2005) (This paper “presents a synthetic overview of the
numerous reforms, which at the most general level aim to fix the audit process, increase board
independence, and improve disclosure and transparency.”); John C. Coates IV, The Goals and
Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 91 (2007) (“At its core, the Sarbanes-
Oxley legislation was designed to fix auditing of U.S. public companies, which is consistent with
the official name of the law: the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act
of 2002 . . . . Sarbanes-Oxley created a unique, quasi-public institution to oversee and regulate
auditing, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).”); Bernhard Kuschnik, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: “Big Brother Is Watching You” or Adequate Measures of Corporate Gov-
ernance Regulation?, 5 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 64, 69–89 (2008) (reviewing SOX corporate govern-
ance provisions); J. Robert Brown Jr., Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes-Oxley and Quack
Corporate Governance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 309, 309 (2006) (“SOX, named after its putative spon-
sors, sought to improve corporate disclosure by increasing the gatekeeper function of outside
accounting firms and heightening the supervisory role of top officers and the board.”); Paula J.
Dalley, Public Company Corporate Governance Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 185 (2003) (explaining the SOA’s “mechanism for affecting corporate govern-
ance is primarily through mandating disclosure of governance practices and policies.”); Lawrence
E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 1189, 1189–90 (2003) (“The Act makes three specific changes in the way we think about
corporate governance: first, it brings into the realm of internal governance the gatekeepers that
once stood outside the box, including auditors, analysts and lawyers. Second, it significantly en-
hances the legal status of, and centrality of corporate governance to, the chief executive officer
and the audit committee, two constituents that have received very little recognition in the law and
its literature. Third, both in doing this and in other respects (like the prohibition of loans to of-
ficers and certain other conflict of interest transactions), it federalizes an important dimension of
the internal laws of corporate governance, creating a new (albeit arguably narrow) duty of care for
the CEO and audit committee and reintroducing serious prohibitions on conflict of interest trans-
actions that have eroded to nothingness in the hands of the Delaware judiciary and legislature.”).
41. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203
§§ 951–956, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1903 (2010).
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Governance adjustments via stable rules in reaction to a systemic
shock can result in suboptimal governance outcomes, market volatility, and
economic loss. While a comprehensive evaluation is beyond the scope of
this comment, some initial observations include the following: corporate
governance reforms are often enacted as a response to a particular lack of
oversight that resulted in a crisis. Governance adjustments are often enacted
merely to address the then-perceived problem in the given market environ-
ment and in the then-existing economic conditions, without regard to possi-
ble future developments.42 Worse yet, following the enactment, governance
adjustments are often later repealed or diluted.43 Anticipation of future de-
velopments and preemption of possible future crises do not play a signifi-
cant role in the top-down approach to regulation.44 However, the economic
conditions and the corresponding requirements for optimal and stable rules
are constantly evolving. Financial innovation, the globalization of markets,
transnationalism, ethical challenges, and the bounded rationality of humans,
among many other factors, are likely to create and perhaps increase future
challenges that may require additional and perhaps more extensive govern-
ance adjustments.
The shortcomings of inflexible rules, especially the perpetual need for
rule enactment and revision, could justify a supplemental, dynamic ap-
proach to regulating the financial industry.45 Dynamic Regulation would
not replace the established regulatory framework but could enhance and
extend it.46 While a detailed evaluation and justification for this regulatory
approach is beyond the scope of this comment,47 Dynamic Regulation as a
regulatory approach may be summarized with several core elements: (1)
Dynamic Regulation suggests an adapting governance mechanism that is
constantly evolving and adjusting to the given market environment, finan-
cial innovation, and the given regulatory environment; (2) Dynamic Regu-
42. Lyman Johnson, Beyond the Inevitable and Inadequate Regulation of Bankers: A Com-
ment on Painter, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 29, 30 (2010) (“The pattern goes like this: a perceived
problem, originating in the private business realm, is thought to have sufficiently dire social con-
sequences that some form of new regulation is proposed. A predictable debate ensues as to
whether regulation is needed at all and, if so, as to whether the particular proposal is the right kind
of regulation.”).
43. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends
to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1076–78 (2012).
44. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis:
It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs 48 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.law.umn.edu/uploads/12/d7/12d77c902205da28b32a345e4497654e/CLEAN-EMCH-4-1-
12-2-2-Kraakman.pdf (arguing that legal rules are not intended to anticipate earthquakes in the
financial industry); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Fall:
Where Do We Stand Following the Financial Crisis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF CORPORATE LAW 456 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, eds., 2012).
45. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry, 49 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Kaal, Dynamic].
46. Id.
47. See id.
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lation may help avoid the regulatory sine curve48 and its negative and costly
consequences; (3) Dynamic Regulation could provide a self-enforcement
mechanism, independent from the existing regulatory structure and agency
enforcement; and (4) Dynamic Regulation may enable regulators to antici-
pate future changes and challenges and adapt stable rules accordingly.49
A dynamic approach is worth exploring in the context of Professor
Fairfax’s critique of the duty of oversight and the role of directors in corpo-
rate governance. As Professor Fairfax points out, directors are outsiders
working part-time, and the increasing complexities of modern corporations
could make it unreasonable to expect directors to comply with increased
oversight responsibilities.50 Using court decisions and stable rules to make
“the oversight role more robust to ensure that directors pay greater attention
to their monitoring responsibilities”51 could be insufficient. By contrast,
contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance could help improve
the duty of oversight. Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs), for instance,
could be one form of dynamic governance that may be able to temporarily
increase fiduciary duties as a form of quasi law.52 CIAs may be seen as an
adapting governance mechanism that is constantly evolving and adjusting to
the specific ethical challenges of the respective corporations.53 A more in-
depth evaluation of dynamic approaches and their potential for corporate
governance improvements is beyond the scope of this comment. More re-
search may be needed to understand how dynamic forms of governance
could help improve directors’ adherence to fiduciary duties and the quality
of corporate governance.
48. Coffee, supra note 43, at 1029–30.
49. Kaal, Dynamic, supra note 45.
50. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 418. R
51. Id. at 3.
52. Wulf A. Kaal & Elizabeth R. Malay, Corporate Integrity Agreements as Quasi Fiduciary
Duties (arguing that corporate integrity agreements could increase fiduciary duties as quasi law)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
53. Id.
